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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CARRIE JOHNSON, 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON, 
Appellant and Cross-Appellee, 
Case No. 981484-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
Appellee's Statement of the Relevant Facts starting at page 4 of Appellee's brief 
misstates and at times contradict the record before the Court. For this reason Appellant finds 
it necessary to rebut certain parts thereof, and does so by reference to each paragraph of 
Appellee's Statement of Relevant Facts in Appellee's Response Brief. 
From hereon after, Appellant is referred to as Husband, and Appellee is referred to 
as Wife. 
Wife also repeatedly complains that Husband has failed to martial the facts before the 
Court. Husband supported his arguments with the record and marshaled the relevant facts 
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before the Court on each issue raised where it was necessary to make a challenge to the trial 
court's factual findings. Nevertheless, this claim is rebutted throughout this brief. 
1. Husband's goals were not unclear. He knew from the start he wanted to practice 
medicine, the only question was what type of medicine he wanted to practice. (T at 
315-16). The trial court made no factual finding on this point and Husband questions 
the motivation for making this claim on appeal. 
2. Husband attended community college for exactly one quarter. (T at 73). 
3. Wife attended one class during her time at BYU for Husband. (T at 335). No finding 
of fact was entered by the trial court as to whether Husband had poor grades nor 
whether Wife was of assistance in getting Husband involved with work at the County 
Crisis Hotline. (T at 77). In fact, there was testimony that Husband was working 
there before Wife and assisted her in getting involved in that type of work. (T at 
399). 
4. Substantially a correct statement of the facts. 
5. Wife did not give up her teaching career to move to California. She chose to pursue 
a different career after she moved to California. (T at 76, 79-80, 123, 130, 147, 316-
18). Husband was adamant that Wife would not manage his practice and testified that 
her eagerness was troubling to him. (T at 335). 
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6. Woodward testified that Wife's goal was to manage Husband's office as a "team", not 
that these were Husband's goals; that Wife applied, not that Husband and Wife 
applied; and that Wife chose to forsake her teaching career, not that Husband forbade 
her to pursue a teaching career. (T at 25-40, 393-94). Furthermore, the testimony 
was contradictory whether Husband relied upon Wife in conducting research for the 
papers and articles he published, and the trial court made no finding on this point. (T 
at 318). 
7. It was also contested with no finding made by the trial court whether Wife's 
employment with Dr. Wolpa had any influence whether beneficial or otherwise upon 
Husband's publishing endeavors. (T at 318-20, 398-99). The second article 
published by Husband was not "based" on Wife's experience at the clinic, and 
although Wife assisted in this article, she received recognition as a co-author. (T at 
88). It was also contested whether Husband's publishing listed on his resume was 
even a factor in him getting his residency. (Tat 318). Husband also pubhshed other 
articles in which Wife had no involvement. (T at 318). 
8. There was no evidence or testimony on the extent of the injuries sustained by Wife 
in the automobile accident, at least not any from which it could be concluded that 
3 
Wife suffered "months of continual painful headaches, muscle spasms and pain." (T 
at 32-33, 101-102). 
9. The parties did not "survive on" Wife's retirement of $ 1,766, but rather this money 
was used to move the couple to Southern California. (T at 99), 
10. Substantially a correct statement of the facts. 
11. Substantially a correct statement of the facts. 
12. Wife states that "Husband had minimal overhead requirements" and cites to the 
transcript at pages 359 through 360, but there simply is no testimony offered there 
supporting this statement. 
13. The $20,000 per month figure was merely used as a basis for Jensen to provide a 
quote for his collection services. (T at 51). 
14. The word "concern" was never used nor implied and the $20,000 figure was never 
mentioned as a basis for taking the Husband's accounts. 
15. Husband adamantly denied any romantic relationship with Laura Rogers, and there 
was no proof of any kind presented to the trial court on this point. (T at 284-87, 290. 
308). Innuendoes were made by counsel throughout the proceedings but there simply 
was no proof offered. Furthermore, the reliability of the figures relating to amounts 
billed were in question because Medi-Serve was also at the same time billing for 
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services provided during prior months. (T at 275). Jensen testified that he was never 
made aware of any reasons that billing would be falling, not that he would necessarily 
know. (Tat56, 337). 
16. There was no finding as to the reliability of the leasing application as an indicator of 
Husband's actual income. 
17. Whether the notebooks were reflective of actual revenues was disputed and the trial 
court did not make a finding on this question. (T at 272-73). 
18. No testimony was ever presented that the $12,246 was entirely made up of 
commissions on billing collections. In fact the record suggests that part of this figure 
was also for secretarial services unrelated to billings. (T at 274-75, PI. Ex. 68). 
19. Substantially a correct statement of the facts. 
20. Again, the trial court made no finding as to whether a romantic relationship ever 
existed between Husband and Laura Rogers. There was also no testimony that any 
monies were being held, funneled off or otherwise to reduce the recorded revenues 
from Husband's practice. (T at 307). That Medicare allows billing to occur up to a 
year later does not mean Husband was sitting on billings, and in fact the testimony 
was to the effect that to do so would be risky considering Husband's pending 
difficulties with Medicare and the possibility he might loose his right to bill through 
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them. (T at 321-23, 332-33, 396). Furthermore, the trial court made no findings on 
this point. 
21. There were no amounts proven or offered by Wife in regard to the alleged cash 
hidden in the home other than the $2,000 which would make little difference to any 
calculation the trial court was required to make regarding Husband and Wife's 
incomes. (T at 143-45). There was also nothing offered suggesting the cash back 
Husband allegedly held when making deposits was any significant amount of money. 
(Tat 311, 354-55). 
22. The deposition of Laura Rogers was not received into the record because it was not 
offered for any relevant purpose. (T at 411-14). The trial court refused to find the 
witness "unavailable" because Wife failed to serve this witness appropriately. (T at 
312-13). Wife does not challenge the trial court's ruling on appeal and Husband is 
at a loss why this was brought up in the relevant facts section of the Wife's brief. 
Furthermore, Laura Rogers gave Husband notice a week before trial. (T at 287). 
Husband did not fire her as Wife suggests. 
23. There was no evidence presented that Husband was hiding other accounts, and this 
should not be implied on appeal especially since no finding on this item was made by 
the trial court. The trial court obviously gave little credence to the financial statement 
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mentioned as it was merely an application for an automobile lease. And the $20,000 
figure Jensen testified to was only a figure used to set the collections commission 
Jensen's company would charge for its services. There was no testimony that it had 
any real relation to the actual billing numbers. 
24. Substantially a correct statement of the facts. 
25. The testimony was that Husband was instructed to file the returns by H & R Block, 
regardless of whether he had obtained his Wife's signature or not. (T at 294-95, 325-
27, 329). 
26. While the trial court found that Husband was being less than forthright about his 
income, it made no reference to which facts it was relying upon in making this 
finding. Wife is assuming that the trial court found the 1995 and 1996 deposits 
unreliable, but in fact the trial court expressly relied upon these deposit figures in 
determining Husband's income for the prior years. Clearly, the trial court found the 
deposits figures reliable or it would not have relied upon them. 
27. Note 6 is simply a falsehood. Husband maintains two separate offices on a part time 
basis at the respective rates of $ 1,200 per month and $50 per month. (T at 366). The 
lease payment on the Volvo from which Husband does practice out of its trunk, is 
$420 per month. (T at 277-78). Husband has student loan payments of 
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approximately $1,700 per month. (T at 283, 368-69). Phone is $500 per month. (T 
at 367). Taxes are approximately $550 per month. (T at 366). Secretarial and 
collection fees range in the $1,200 per month area. (T at 367). Office supplies are 
in the $250 range per month. (T at 367). Malpractice insurance costs Husband $740 
per month. (T at 369). And gas runs Husband about $200 per month. (T at 366). 
Although this is not an exhaustive itemization of Husband necessary business 
expenses, it alone totals $6,860 per month, or as an annual rate, it is $82,320 per year. 
This is far above the $40,000 figure Wife contends as being excessive. Wife provides 
a considerable array of figures but fails to cite to the record for these figures. 
28. Wife provides a considerable array of figures but fails to cite to the record for these 
figures. 
29. There was no evidence of additional income received outside of what was billed by 
Laura Rogers during this period when she was handling the billing. (T at 307). 
30. Husband did not make $20,000 per month in 1995. 
31. There was no testimony from Wife's vocational expert to the effect that there was no 
medical office positions available in Davis County that Wife would have been 
qualified for. (T at 400-11). Further still, the only testimony was that Wife had 
applied to a couple medical offices and she was told she would have to work until 
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7:00 p.m. (T at 148,150). There was no evidence of how many offices she contacted 
or whether all required her to work until 7:00 p.m. The testimony was that Wife had 
re-certified, but that she was unsuccessful getting a teaching job because there was 
a "glut" of English teachers and therefore the District would not interview her. (T at 
153-54). 
32. The speculations presented by Wife's vocational expert were groundless with regard 
to pay scale and retirement figures had Wife began teaching in 1987 because there 
was no evidence that Wife would have had a good chance of entering that field in 
1987. In fact, she went to California with her father before moving there to find a 
teaching job and did not find one. (T at 76). The English teachers "glut" could very 
well have been a problem then as well, and thus, her failure to enter the field would 
then be a matter of poor planning by Wife. 
33. Wife was unable to pay because she used the insurance money she received to 
remodel the kitchen instead of simply repairing it as the money was intended to be 
used. (Tat 373-77). In regard to the $6,000 received from Husband's grandfather 
for a down payment on the home, there was absolutely no testimony relating to the 
grandfather's intent that it be a gift to both parties. (T at 373-74). 
34. The Husband's Volvo is not a sports car. (T at 365). 
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35. Wife testified that she had not paid for a vacation. She did not testify that she had not 
had a vacation. (T at 161-62). 
36. Substantially a correct statement of the facts. 
37. than Wife's own testimony, there was no evidence that the costs associated with 
private school were equivalent to those for child care. 
38. Husband's business records did not evidence an income of $240,000. 
39. Substantially a correct statement of the facts. 
40. Substantially a correct statement of the facts. 
41. Substantially a correct statement of the facts. 
42. Substantially a correct statement of the facts. 
43. The trial court was not bound to accept all fees listed on the affidavit as being 
reasonable. Argument was presented at trial that Wife's attorney had billed for a 
greater number of hours than what was required for equivalent work and service. (T 
at 431-32). 
ARGUMENT 
REBUTTAL TO WIFE'S RESPONSE BRIEF 
I. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion Setting Income Levels For The Parties. 
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A. Mrs. Johnson's Income 
Wife repeatedly claims that Husband fails to marshal the evidence in challenging the 
trial court's findings of fact. This argument is made even though Husband marshals the 
relevant facts presented at trial in his brief from pages 12 to 14. Wife's complaint is without 
merit 
The income imputed to Wife of $1,000 per month was without a basis in the record. 
It is clear that she could have secured employment either as a teacher, a medical office 
worker, or any number of other occupations. The only evidence presented at trial was that 
she could not find a job teaching English in the Davis County School District. There was 
no testimony that she could not get a teaching job outside of Davis County School District 
either in another public school district or with a private institution. There was no testimony 
that employment was not available in a medical office. In fact the evidence suggested that 
she turned down such employment because she did not want to work until 7:00 p.m. There 
was no testimony or any other kind of evidence that she did not have opportunities at other 
offices. There was also no testimony that she could not do something other than be an 
English Teacher in the Davis County School District. The testimony was clear that she had 
skills in the areas of medical procedure, research, editing, office procedure, billing, computer 
experience, and considerable language skills. (T at 77-78, 85-88, 151-52). Regardless of 
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which of the types of jobs Wife eventually took, with her skills, she would be employed at 
a rate considerably higher than the $1,000 per month imputed to her by the court. Her own 
witness testified that she made $18,000 per year while working as an office assistant for 
Doctor Wolpa. (T at 85-86). The $1,000 per month wage imputed to her would equal the 
wage of a substitute teacher working full time — that is $50 per day. Such a wage is 
unrealistic and ignores the evidence presented that Wife had considerable marketable skills. 
B. Mr. Johnson's Income 
Wife argues that it was within the trial court's discretion to ignore the amounts 
Husband had to re-pay Medicare because there was some evidence that Husband had to re-
pay because he failed to document services correctly and it was uncontested that he had re-
billed for these services. Nevertheless, there was no evidence of the amount Husband had 
re-billed nor that he had received any of the funds which were re-billed. In fact, the only 
testimony was from Husband who stated that nothing had come of the re-billing. (T at 396). 
The trial court used the deposits records of Husband's for 1995, 1996 and 1997 to 
determine Husband's income. Wife presented this evidence and then failed to provide 
adequate evidence that there were receipts other than those recorded in the deposits records. 
Where receipts were shown to exist outside the deposits record, they were either of 
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negligible dollar amounts or there was no presentation of evidence at all as to the dollar 
amounts involved. 
Wife also challenges the trial court's "liberal" setting of Husband's necessary business 
expenses, arguing that the $3,333 per month figure was way too low. However, the 
uncontested evidence was as follows: Husband maintains two separate offices on a part time 
basis at the respective rates of $1,200 per month and $50 per month. (T at 366). The lease 
payment on the Volvo from which Husband does practice out of its trunk, is $420 per month. 
(T at 277-78). Husband has student loan payments of approximately $ 1,700 per month. (T 
at 283, 368-69). Phone is $500 per month. (T at 367). Taxes are approximately $550 per 
month. (Tat 366). Secretarial and collection fees range in the $1,200 per month area. (T 
at 367). Office supplies are in the $250 range per month. (T at 367). Malpractice insurance 
costs Husband $740 per month. (T at 369). And gas runs Husband about $200 per month. 
(T at 366). Although this is not an exhaustive itemization of Husband's necessary business 
expenses, it alone totals $6,860 per month, or as an annual rate, it is $82,320 per year. This 
is far above the $40,000 figure Wife contends as being excessive. Wife provides a 
considerable array of figures but fails to cite to the record for these figures. 
Furthermore, Wife argues that the Student Loans are personal expenses and not 
necessary business expenses. Medicare clearly sees these expenses as being necessary to 
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Husband's business because as the record shows, if he does not pay them, he cannot bill 
through Medicare. Although it is a personal debt, the taking on of the student loan debt was 
clearly for the benefit of his business since had he not acquired the debt he could not very 
well have finished medical school and began business as a podiatrist. The reality is that 
these debt payments are directly related and necessary to the on going ability of Husband to 
earn the income the trial court has found him capable of earning. 
On pages 395 and 396 of the trial transcript, Wife's counsel is successful in getting 
Husband to testify that he is not past the brink on his student loans. This Wife then uses on 
appeal to claim that the status of the student loans is not in jeopardy. A twisting of the facts 
and the plain words of the transcript are necessary in order to believe that the Husband's 
student loans are not in jeopardy of going into default and full payment being demanded. 
n The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Awarding Wife An Interest In 
Husband's Professional Degree. 
The objection that Husband has failed to marshal the evidence on this point is without 
merit for the reason that the standard set out in Utah Medical v. Seary. 958 P.2d 228, 232 
(Utah 1998), is without application. Husband challenges the trial court's application of the 
law not the trial court's findings of fact. It is without dispute that Wife contributed in some 
way to Husband successfully becoming a podiatrist, in the same manner that he encouraged 
and supported her in her own endeavors. That is not the point of dispute, however, between 
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the parties. The point of dispute is that under Utah law, it is an abuse of discretion to award 
as part of a property division an interest in one of the parties' professional status to the other 
party. Wife refers to this division as an entitlement, which exemplifies exactly why such an 
award is not recognized in Utah. A degree is personal and another is never "entitled" to its 
benefits merely because the other provided encouragement. That Husband was on the verge 
of building his practice would justifiably be a consideration in determining the amount of 
alimony, and had Wife actually paid tuition and books or the like, it would be a consideration 
in setting the length of the term alimony should be paid. But here the court essentially gave 
Wife a lien on Husband's professional status for the next five years. Such an award is 
simply not allowed under Utah law as it is exactly the type of equitable restitution this Court 
rejected in Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). 
Ill The Trial Court's Division Of Marital Property And Debt Was An Abuse Of 
Discretion 
A. Marital Home 
The trial court without any basis in the record found that the $9,500 gift from 
Husband's Grandfather was to both parties. (T at 338-39, 340, 342, 346-49). There simply 
was no basis in the record for the court to come to this conclusion. Furthermore, if such was 
a gift to both parties, at a minimum Husband was entitled to an award of $4,500 in the home. 
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Further still, the trial court supported its finding by stating that Husband would benefit 
until retirement from his degree. This is exactly the type of speculation that this Court 
rejected in Martinez, supra. 
B. Marital Debt 
Husband has fully set out the relevant facts on this issue. Wife's objections are 
without merit. 
IV The Court Failed To Impute An Appropriate Income To Wife Given The 
Uncontested Evidence That She Has Marketable Skills Making Her Able To 
Earn Considerably More Than The $1,000 Imputed To Her As Income By The 
Court 
Husband does not contest that it is unlikely that Wife will be able to secure 
employment as an English Teacher working within the Davis County Public School District. 
Husband does, however, contest the necessity of Wife earning an additional advanced degree 
in order to support herself and make herself marketable. Wife has marketable skills: She 
types, knows how to run an office, knows the medical billing industry, has editing skills, 
language skills, computer skills, research skills, and certainly other skills that were not 
necessarily brought out at trial. (T at 335, 77-78, 85-88). The trial court's ruling ignored the 
marketable skills Wife already possessed and instead focused entirely upon her training as 
an English teacher. The $1,000 imputed to her as income was exactly that which would be 
16 
earned if she were to substitute teach at $50 per day full time. This wage is unrealistic in a 
world where people with merely a high school education earn $80 to $100 per day. 
V Tax Exemption Should Have Been Awarded Husband Under The Standard Set 
Out In Motes 
In Allred v. Allred. 835 P.2d 974, 977-78 (Utah App. 1992), the Court of Appeals 
relied upon the standard set out in Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989) in 
determining whether and to whom the tax exemptions should be awarded. Both of these 
cases were cited by Wife in her brief. Under that standard, a presumption exists in favor of 
the custodial parent receiving the exemption. But, the presumption may be rebutted if (1) 
the non-custodial parent has a higher income and provides the majority of the support for the 
children; and (2) transferring the exemptions to the non-custodial parent will not only be in 
the parties best interest but in the best interest of the children as well. Here, the Wife is 
currently unemployed and therefore has no need for the exemptions other than to write off 
against her alimony payments. On the other hand, we have Husband who is gainfully 
employed and provides the entirety of the support for the children. (T at 377). The trial 
court awarded Husband an exemption for one child and the Wife an exemption for two 
children, without the possibility of Husband purchasing the exemptions from Wife. Had that 
possibility been permitted, it clearly would have been in the best interests of the children. 
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The trial court's ruling on this issue cannot stand as it is in direct contradiction to the 
standard set out in Motes. 
VI Inheritance 
Husband's inheritance was received after the date of separation and was therefore 
separate property. (T at 338-39, 340, 342, 346-49). 
VII Insurance 
The case cited by Wife, Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah App. 1996), is 
inapplicable as that case dealt with retrospective payments awarded in order to compensate 
a step parent for paying the premiums. Here, we have the trial court ordering prospective 
payments as they come due. The plain language of the statute makes it clear that the order 
of the trial court requiring Husband to pay the entire premium cannot stand. 
VIII The Trial Court's Award Of Attorneys Fees Was Excessive 
The trial court had before it evidence of what was billed for depositions by each 
parties' attorneys. The considerable difference in billed hours was brought to the trial 
court's attention by Husband's counsel. Repeatedly Wife's counsel billed a greater number 
of hours than what was reasonably necessary for nearly identical services. Furthermore, 
much of the evidence presented by Wife at trial emphasized matters that did not forward her 
case. That is, it was not a case presented efficiently. Furthermore, the case was slowed due 
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to counsel's repeated failure to lay a proper foundation for the questioning being employed. 
The trial court was well within its discretion to award less than what was requested in 
attorneys fees. 
Nevertheless, the trial court did abuse its discretion in not providing the specific 
grounds for its award of attorneys fees and this Court should therefore remand the case in 
order for the trial court to enter an appropriate finding of fact on this issue. 
RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL 
IX Wife's Contempt 
The record is clear that the Wife had not denied visitation to Husband while a court 
order was in place. Nor were there any motions made to hold Wife in contempt of court. 
For this reason Husband does not contest this issue. 
X Wife Did Not Present "Overwhelming Evidence" That Husband's Income 
Exceeded His Deposits To The VA Credit Union Accounts 
Wife attacks the trial court's reliance on the deposits into the VA Credit Union 
accounts as an estimate of Husband's income. Wife relies on conjectures about a romantic 
relationship between Husband and his bookkeeper Laura Rogers. Wife relies on her 
assertions made in her relevant fact portion of her brief in paragraphs 11 through 22 and note 
4. Wife's reliance on this slighted version of the facts is misplaced. Husband has already 
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pointed out the problems with paragraphs 12 though 22, and those are reasserted as though 
fully set out herein. 
XI The Court Considered The Tax Consequences Of The Awarded Alimony As This 
Is The Only Explanation For Awarding Her The Tax Exemptions For The Two 
Children, Especially Since The Court Did Not Award The Right To Purchase The 
Exemptions 
The trial court awarded Wife two exemptions and did not provide for the possibility 
of Husband purchasing the exemptions. Wife did not at the time have a job, and the court 
only imputed a $ 1,000 per month income to her. Yet, Wife argues that the trial court did not 
take into consideration that she would have tax liability on the alimony and the child support 
payments. Husband is at a loss responding to this argument since it is highly unlikely that 
Wife will have any significant tax liability at all. Wife's argument reduces in the end to the 
fact that she thinks the alimony and child support awards should have been more. Such is 
no basis for reversing the trial court's findings. Also, this issue was not presented at trial and 
as such may not now be raised on appeal. See Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Ut. App. 
1993); Fletcher v.Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Ut. 1980). 
XII Bond Issue 
It was well within the trial court's discretion to determine whether a security bond 
was necessary. 
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XIII Attorney Fees 
The trial court was not bound to accept all fees listed on the affidavit as being 
reasonable. Argument was presented at trial that Wife's attorney had billed for a greater 
number of hours than what was required for equivalent work and service. (T at 431-32). 
Arguments set out in part VIII are incorporated here as though fully set out herein. 
XIV Attorney Fees On Appeal 
Wife's claim of attorney fees is without merit as Husband marshaled the evidence in 
support of his challenges to the trial court's findings of fact. Until this appeal is decided and 
it can be determined who the prevailing party is and on which issues, there are no grounds 
for awarding attorney fees to either party on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Wife's response brief alleges that Husband failed to marshal the facts for this Court's 
review and then proceeds to present a distorted view of the evidence. Much of the "relevant 
facts" presented by Wife has little or no relevance to the issues presented on appeal. 
Nevertheless, Wife uses the record to make innuendo and engage in speculation in order to 
cast Husband in a poor light before this Court. A similar tactic was employed by Wife's 
counsel at trial This strategy has made the presentation of the issues on appeal and at trial 
far more time consuming and expensive than what would normally be the case. 
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The trial court unfortunately failed to recognize Wife's many marketable skills and 
to consider these when imputing income to her for the purpose of determining child support 
and alimony. This failure alone justifies this case being remanded back to the trial court for 
more specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, however, Wife now argues 
that the trial court failed to consider all of Husband's income because there was 
"overwhelming evidence" that he was somehow funneling receipts away from his recorded 
income. Her claim is simply not supported by the record. Again, the only support for the 
argument that the trial court failed to consider receipts "funneled off from Husband's 
recorded income is support grounded on innuendo and speculation. 
Wife also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in setting Husband's 
reasonably business expenses at $40,000 per year and that this was way too "liberal" a 
figure. If anything, the evidence is that it was way too conservative of a figure, that a more 
realistic figure would be in the $80,000 range. 
Wife was awarded the entirety of the equity in the home, considerable alimony and 
child support, very little debt, and sole custody of the children. The trial court ordered the 
first five years of alimony to be non-terminable, and for the alimony to otherwise run the full 
length of the marriage. The totality of the award is a long way from the presumption that all 
property and debts should be equally awarded, and the only reasonable conclusion that can 
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be drawn is that the trial court found that Wife was "entitled" to an award of an interest in 
Husband's professional status. Such an award, whether termed equitable restitution or 
otherwise, has been rejected repeatedly by this Court. Nevertheless, the trial court somehow 
recognized a property interest in Husband's professional status that should be split with 
Wife. This was a clear abuse of the discretion a trial court has in determining an equitable 
distribution of the marital assets and debts, and an err of law requiring the reversal of the trial 
court's decision. 
The trial court failed to follow the standard set out in Motes for determining who 
should be awarded the right to claim the minor children as exemptions for tax purposes. The 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law fail to state why this award was made and the 
record clearly supported a ruling in the other direction. On cross-appeal, Wife claims the 
trial court failed to consider the tax consequences of the award of alimony and therefore it 
should be redetermined. This claim is groundless considering the failure to award the 
exemptions to husband or at least the opportunity to purchase the exemptions. With these 
exemptions, Wife's tax liability will be minimal at best. 
Wife also challenges the trial court's refusal to require Husband to post a security 
bond and the attorneys fees awarded as being too low. Wife ignores the fact that the trial 
court has broad discretion in determining what actions it will take in order to secure 
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compliance once one of the parties has been found in contempt. Wife also ignores the fact 
that much of the billing presented by her counsel was excessive and considerable delay 
resulted from counsel's continuous failure to lay a proper foundation for his questioning, and 
in trying the case on speculation and innuendo rather than on the facts. The trial court was 
well within its discretion to cut back the hours billed by Wife's counsel as not being 
reasonably necessary and / or not efficiently tried. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand this case back to the trial court in 
order to make specific findings of fact and correct conclusions of law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day pfMafch, 199S 
KANDY S ^ U D i ^ W 
Attorney forAppeuant/Cross- Appellee 
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